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SUBJECI'IVITY AS BODY AND MIND
It can be said that Jean Paul Sartre has never stopped to
theorize on subjectivity, more or less implicitly. The question to pose is
whether he conceives of it in a Hegelian or post-Hegelian way. The
chrono-Iogical setting leaves no doubt that Sartre is indeed a post-
Hegelian, but it must be specified how his theory confronts the Hegelian
system. How Sartre conceives of subjectivity and what role he assigns to
it is the aim of these pages, which comment on a lecture presented by
Sartre in 1961 at the [slitulo Gramsei in Rome.
The first question that Sartre poses is whether subjectivity is of
interest to a Marxist philosophy, or whether it should be left to other
specialized disciplines and separate schools of thought. After having
stated that subjectivity must not be confused with the Hegelian dichotomy
of subject and object, Sartre specifies that subjectivity implies an "internal
action," a "system in interiority" that excludes an unmediated contact with
the subject. He criticizes some Marxist positions that end up by denying
any role to subjectivity, labeling them idealistic, naive, and tied to a
fetishization of commodities, not unconnected to an easy and potentially
misleading symbolism. Then Sartre goes on to reiterate that sUbjectivity
cannot be accounted for without taking transcendence into consideration.
Transcendence must not be given an idealistic or, even worse,
a theological meaning. It must instead be conceived of as tied to the
"psychosomatic unity" of the organism that needs, works, and enjoys.
Psycho-somatic unity is caught in an objectivity that as such escapes
knowledge and has consequences that can be unpredictable. This not-
knowledge constitutes, or helps to constitute, the opposite of
transcendence, what Sartre calls interiority. By means of the organism,
this interiority mediates the transcendence of work, forming a
materialistic-dialectical system. Pure subjectivity, on the other hand, is
lhe result of our ignorance of a duality within exteriority.
Praxis itself is the product, the subject-object, of a subjec-tivity
that ignores itself. Granted that Sartre denies a dialectic of nature, or at
least delimits its range, either because it is unknowable, or because he
conceives ofnature as unchangeableand unaffected by a purely idealistic
approach. He states that once subjectivity has been affected by the
object, it will go through constant change. This is praxis, though not
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necessarily a conscious one.
The next question that Sartre poses to his listeners is how we
can know praxis. The epistemological question comes to the fore when
we pose the question of a subjectivity that is in eonstant transformation
(a transformation that is also due to the teehnological changes of the
working psyehosomatic unity). Subjectivity and truth are in a dialeetical
relation, and neither--Sartre says--is an object. This debatable conclusion
will be ehallenged by strueturalists and post-strueturalists, whose purpose
is to deconstruet the notion of subjeet. But Sartre's text does not speaks
of subjectivity as being all-pelVasive in that he denies it to nature as such.
SUbjeetivity relates to the objeet (if we grant for a moment that the objeet
is objeetive) in a subjective way, but in order to become an objeet itself.
In this case, Sartre says, subjectivity is exterior, it has externalized itself,
it has become objeetified, either in work or in other aetivities in whieh it
is engaged.
The first example he gives, taken from medicine, coneerns the
case of a hemianopie, a person who suffers loss of vision in half the visual
filed. This person is not affeeted by a speeific disease, but by a symptom
that may be a manifestation of several conditions, among them
inflammation of the optic nerve. In this symptom, according to Sartre,
subjectivity is "not-knowledge by definition," manifesting its being at the
biologicallevel, in a dialectical relation between the individual and the
organism. It would be interesting to know whether Sartre would have
generalized this theory of his to all symptoms, or at least whether he
eonceived of diseases as always being psychosomatie in origin, as some
psychoanalysts, among them Georg Groddeck, have maintained. On his
part, Jacques Lacan agreed with Sartre at least on this issue, when he
wrote that the symptom is a metaphor, a subjeetive and ereative answer
inscribed in the body of the analysand. Moreover, the metaphor is for
Lacan tied to the Symbolie register or order, the conscious or unconscious
order of linguistic elaboration, whieh in its turn establishes an equally
conseious or unconseious ethics. However, we cannot forget that for
Sartre even not-knowledge can beeome an object of choice, whereas for
Lacan this beeomes a highly improbable event. Sartre speaks in fact of
the hemianopie person as ehoosing his own symptom, his own inertia, his
own conduct, manüesting them in his body, which then becomes "an
elementary pereeptible eonduel." Conduct incarnates itself, it produces,
it manifests itself without disregarding the eonditioning factors that may
be present in a given situation. Certainly Laean does not deny the
subjective side of a disease, but it is doubtful that he would have agreed
that a person eonseiously chooses his own diseases.
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In abstract philosophical terms, Sartre says that subjectivity
internalizes the changing external reality and makes it into an ought-to-
be, in order subsequently to externalize it thanks to "organic energies."
This violent process, or project, implies a reconstituting of the organism,
a process notdevoid ofmoral and ethical implications, not to mention the
political ones that engaged Sartre at the time. The French philosopher
therefore does not subscribe to an idealistic notion of subjectivity: He
knows fuU weIl that the subject is also the result of conditioning, an
unconscious process that forces the subject itself to a form of repetition.
Repetition is not simply foreseeable, it can be spontaneous and can
generate surprise; but, when subjectivity is externalized, Sartre says, it
leads to institutionalization. When this happens, "the subjective person"
becomes a "set of duties."
Sartre mentions psychoanalytic theory only en passant. Yet he
is weIl aware of its theoretical and practical importance, recognizing that
psychoanalysis is a praxis. Sartre considers the psychoanalysis of the
subjective person who faces his past with the help of memory; but he is
not interested in the past itself. He says in fact that the past must be
kept at a distance, and this implies a retotalization. In other words, the
past must be reinterpreted. Repetition, which is a mark of sUbjectivity,
is therefore intertwined with retotalization. Such a situation would be an
impasse Ü Sartre did believe that repetition is the only mark of
subjectivity. But another factor intervenes, and this is invention. Again,
the two aspects are in a dialectical relation. The person projects his
being on the outside, but the environment does not allow simple
repetition because the environment changes and, in the process, forces
the person to change. In other words, the new is possible.
This not necessarily optimistic stand shows at least, if there
were any need, that Sartre allies hfmself with progressive thinking and
practice. Human invention is reached, or can be reached, thanks to
subjectivity, and human invention needs praxis. But according to Sartre,
praxis is far from being the product of a "clear consciousness." Creativity,
or invention, needs an obscure factor, which consists in repetition.
Subjectivity is the resulting vector of these two aspects of the person:
repetition and invention. And the implications of such a theory are
important and far-reaching when applied to historical events,
psychoanalysis, and Marxism.
In order not to generate confusion, we must take one step at
a time. Sartre is interested in creativity in that the repetition-invention
of the person is a constant transcending project. Moreover, it is essential
that subjectivity know itself only from the outside, in its products.
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Othetwise--if it becomes too self-conscious and too self-reflecting--it loses
itself. This is why Sartre says that subjectivity is not an object and should
not be reduced to one.
We must not forget that here Sartre is speaking to bis audience
in 1961, a year after tbe publication of Critique of Dialectical Reason,
and tberefore he is eager to present and discuss bis theory as it has been
applied in this work. Needless to say, the audience itself must have
expected such an application. The question then becomes one of asking
wbether subjectivity is necessary in order to know dialectically the social
reality. The answer that Sartre gives is in the positive, but this point must
be qualified carefully. Men constantly mediate and project their class-
being, but they face (or tbeyare the product of) the practico-inert in their
daily life at work or at horne. If the practico-inert prevails (but we know
that this is not Sartre's last word, or at least not his imperative) the
singularization (that is, the division) of class-being is lived blindly. And
here intervenes the subjective moment, the inner mode of struggle, which
is in part tbe result of the objective, historical moment. This subjective
moment is necessary for any progressive development, both in sociallife
and in history--understood,of course, in a dialectical, nonmechanicalway.
A few considerations are in order to help us understand what
Sartre has told us up to now. It is clear that he was not looking for a
servile imitation and literaI interpretation of the Hegelian system.
However, Sartre was weIl aware of the necessity to incorporate Hegers
thought at least in part, since both men conceive of history and the
person in dialectical terms. The same holds true, of course, for Marx's
thought. How much Sartre has taken and accepted from Hegel and Marx
can be outlined here only in a summary way. What is clear is that Sartre
is looking for a sUbjective system, just as Hegel does. (Hegel's famous
dictum that the substance is subject must be called to mind here.) And
Sartre also incorporates Marx, who, among other things, was looking for
a class system that would guarantee the political and economic dignity of
the working class. Unlike Nietzscbe--for example--Sartre is not looking
for a unique system, whose impossibility is all too clear to any biographer
of Nietzsche.
In Sartre, subjectivity is central. It includes interiority and an
organism that absorbs the environment so as to attain objective
knowledge. This is no mere passive process. Sartre includes activity at
the heart of bis system--never forgetting the passivity involved in the
process of absorption. Very succinctly he states that "we are forced to be
Ilour being." To know oneself thus means to change oneself, in a self-
I
transcending way.
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This conclusion, however tentative it may be, leads us back to
the problem of psychoanalysis. Sartre is explicit on this issue: He asserts
that psychoanalysis implies a bad metaphysics and that he is personally
opposed to the analytic experience for lack of political will. He is also
skeptical about the accomplishments that psychoanalysis can offer and,
moreover, is uncommitted to such a process in that the Sartrean system
implies living in astate of "absolute presence." In other words, Sartre
accuses psychoanalysis of implying, not only a bad metaphysics, but a bad
subjective system.
Above all, Sartre wants a verüication against objective conduct,
believing that only in this way is it possible to achieve self-knowledge.
Moreover, he rejects psychoanalysis because he has already rejected
desire. Having subscribed to the Mandan need-work-enjoymenttriad, he
does not include desire in his later theorizing. Desire instead is central
to any psychoanalytic school that does not ignore the individuality of the
person. In addition, maybe, Sartre saw in psychoanalysis a compromise
that he was not willing to accept. In fact, according to Freud,
unconscious desire, as expressed in dreams, serves two masters. Such a
contradictory state must necessarily resolve itself in compromise, which
entails dirting one's hands, something that Sartre was unwilling to accept.
We are not saying this in order to discredit Sartre's theory, even less to
discredit the man himself. We are simply trying to understand why Sartre
consciously rejects the notion of the unconscious, while himself falling
victim to it.
But there is another consideration. Existence for Sartre has
nothing mysterious in it, and his humanism rejects both Heidegger's
solitary path and the objectifications of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, he
does not deny the psychosomatic reality of the individual. And he is
careful not to reduce Marxism to a simple consideration of need-work-
enjoyment, without including psychic reality. Only this constitutes a
whole. But, Sartre adds, this reality must be given the proper order and
priority. For Marxian thought, need comes first, while enjoyment is
mediated through work. Psychoanalysis, in contrast, certainly does not
deny the biological needs of the individual. But it is less prone to ignore
the fact that the adult has not only needs but desires, and that these also
must be satisfied or fulfilled, directly or indirectly. According to Lacan,
for instance, desire is metonymy, a dynamic process that, if mastered and
understood, leads to metaphoric substitutions such as sublimation.
Neither Freud nor Lacan excludes what is, in Sartre's words, a
"subjectivity that makes itself by creating objectivity." In other words,
psychoanalysis does not ignore praxis or creativity, and there is no need
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to be afraid of a reductionist approach when subjectivity is taken into
consideration. Therefore, psychoanalysis does not ignore synthesis. On
the other hand, Sartre criticizes the Hegelian system as implying a
philosophy of reflection in which Mind grasps itself in an idealistic,
Aristotelian way. Instead, Sartre proposes a theory that, through analytic
regression, leads to a synthetic progression, to history, in which
subjectivity has its place, as it should have. He excludes from
consideration a philosophical and dialectical study of nature; if this
dialectic were possible, and it is not excluded on principle by Sartre,
subjectivity would be part of nature.
A last consideration concerning desire: Sartre speaks of choice
and not of desire. But choice is desire, even though still abstract. It is
perhaps for this reason that we do not know their consequences.
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